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ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION

The Issues for Resolution by the Supreme Court are as
follows:
1.

Did the Defendants have possession of the Disputed

Strip of land?
2.

Was the possession of the Disputed Strip by the

Defendants sufficiently adverse to rebut the presumption of
possession created by UCA 78-12-7,thus barring the Plaintiffs'
claim for quiet title under UCA 78-12-5&6.
3-

Are the Defendants entitled to quiet title in the

disputed strip based on the common law doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs asserted a claim to a strip of property

that extended a 129.4' east of an existing fence line between
the parties by attempting to build a new fence along the east
edge of the disputed strip.

The Defendants caused the posts to

be returned to the Plaintiffs' property.

The Plaintiffs filed

suit, seeking to quiet title to the disputed strip, based on
their alleged record title.

The Defendants answered,

denying the Plaintiffs' allegations, asserting boundary by
acquiescence, and most recently, the affirmative defense of the
Statute of Limitations, UCA 78-12-5 & 6.
trial were held.
Court.

Both a pretrial and a

Evidence and testimony were presented to the

Both parties also presented motions for summary

judgment which were held in abeyance by the Court.

The Court

issued a Written Decision quieting title to the dispute strip
with the Plaintiffs.

After a series of briefs and motions, the

Court also issued its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Decree Quieting Title.

The Defendants* appeal the

decision of the District Court as set forth in its Decision,
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Decree
Quieting Title.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Based on evidence submitted at trial and that

stipulated to in the pretrial order, the following facts where
presented to the District Court:
1.

The disputed strip of land is located in Millard

County, Utah in the area known locally as the Fool Creek Flat,
which is between Oak City and Leamington along State Highway
U-125.

The Defendants* Exhibit 7, (T 42-47, 53, 72-76, 80-82,

90-93, 105, 106, 116, 137-138, 156-157, 160-174) admitted at
trial identifies the properties of the parties, indicates the
location of various fences and corner markers.
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The exhibit has

been reproduced as a part of this brief in order to expedite
the discussion of the issues.
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Explanation of Defendants' Exhibit 7:
T-l. This is the tract of land originally purchased by
the predecessors of the Defendant, Jos.. T. Finlinson, Inc.

It

is not adjacent to the disputed strip.
T-2. This is the tract of land purchased by Jos.. T.
Finlinson, Inc., from the Defendant Gordon Nielson on June 5,
1963.

Included in the T-2 tract is the forty known as the SE

1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 34, T 15 S, R 4 W., SLB&M.

This

40 is located adjacent to the Plaintiffs' 80 described later
herein.

The boundary dispute occurs between this 40 and the

Plaintiffs' 80.
T-2a. This tract belongs to another Nielson, not a
party to this action.

Years ago, the Father of the Defendant

Gordon Nielson entered into an oral agreement with Clarence
Nielson, that this tract would be included with and treated as
a part of T-2.

A corresponding part of T-2, T2b would be

included with and treated as a part of the other Nielson1s
property.

The tracts were then fenced accordingly.
T-2b.
T-3.

See the explanation for T-2a above.
The Plaintiffs' 80, also described as the South

1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section 34, T 15 S, R 4 W, SLB&M.
T-4.

This is the disputed strip.

It can be described

as the East 129.4' of the S 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section 34, T
15 S, R 4 W, SLB&M.

On this exhibit, T-4 is identified as the

parcel contained within points, 5-6-7-8.
- 4 -

This description

however does not describe the extra acreage in the disputed
strip,
1-2-3-4 represents the fence along the north side of
U-125.
5-6 represents the fence between the contesting
parties, however it was built as part of the longer fence 2-5-6.
8 represents the 1982 marker established by the BLM,
which, according to the BLM, establishes the South 1/4 corner
of Section 34, T 15 S, R 4 W, SLB&M.
9 represents the SE corner of said Section 34 which
was initially located in 1870 and was reestablished in 1915. A
brass cap, however, was not placed in this location until 1982
by the BLM.
10 represents the SW corner of section 34 which was
initially located in 1870 and was re-established in 1915. A
brass cap was placed in this location in 1915 and is still in
existence at this location.
11-12-13-14 represent current gates in existing fence
lines.
The distance between points 8 and 10 is 2,689.93' and
the distance between 8 & 9 is 2,689.98*.
2.

Patents from the Federal Government were issued to the

predecessors of both parties.

Roper's patent to the 40 next to

the disputed line, 5-6 was issued in 1916 for the SE 1/4 of the
SW 1/4 of section 34.

Finlinson's predecessor's patent to the
- 5 -

40 next to the disputed line, 5-6 was issued in 1927 for the SW
1/4 of the SE 1/4 of section 34, (T 132). Each patent conveyed
a full 40, with no conflict appearing in the two descriptions,
(T 132).
3.

Predecessors of each party were physically located

on the properties before patents were issued, (T 180-181).
4.

At a time in the early history of the area, most

likely about the turn of the century, there was an old wagon
road between Oak City and Leamington that may have traversed
part of the disputed strip, 5-6-7-8; however, the route was
abandoned when U-125 was located in its present alignment and
fence 1-2-3-4 was built on the north side of the highway, (T
183) .
5.
2-5-6.

The predecessors of the parties built fence

Not one of the witnesses or any of the parties could

remember when either fence had been built or remember when
these fences had not existed.

The oldest witness was 78 years

old, (T 180).
6.

The parties and their predecessors have been

engaged in the business of farming which includes the
activities of growing crops, primarily hay and grain, both
irrigated and dry farm, and raising cattle.

The cattle of both

parties and their predecessors would graze the land controlled
by the respective fences of the parties and their predecessors
from fence line to fence line.

The cattle would forage in
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these fields every year after the crops had been harvested
until the cattle were returned to the summer ranges.

This

practice has not varied substantially since the original
settlers arrived at the Fool Creek Flat, (T 182).
7.

The Jos.. T. Finlinson, Inc. and its predecessors,

Gordon Nielson, and the Estate of Peter Nielson, Peter Nielson
and his wife, Ely, and Edgar Nielson and his family have always
had T-2 fenced with barb wire and cedar post and within this
enclosure conducted their farming activities to the exclusion
of the Plaintiffs and their predecessors.
8.

The Jos.. T. Finlinson, Inc. has improved the

disputed strip in excess of $5 per acre so that it can be
irrigated by sprinkling and has since such time plowed,
planted, harvested and always grazed T-2 from fence to fence,
(T 182). Plaintiffs exhibit 4, a photo, shows the ground
plowed right up to the fence, 2-5-6.

The Defendant, Gordon

Nielson, testified that he plowed up to within 30 feet of the
fence 2-5-6 during the years he farmed T-2 from 1950 to 1963,
(T 166). He further testified that the only reason he didn't
plow up to the fence line was because of a slight wash and
brush and an old tractor which made it difficult and not
economical to plow up to the fence line.

Plaintiffs* exhibit

3, a 1963 aerial map, clearly shows that T-2 has been cleared
from brush along the disputed fence line, 5-6 and is consistent
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with the testimony offered by the Defendants as to their use of
the land included in the T-2 tract, (Exhibit 3 ) .
9.

The issue of the disputed tract, T-4 was not

raised until after the survey work done by the BLM in the
summer of 1982.

Until such time, the records of the Millard

County Recorder, Defendants' exhibit 7, showed that each party
had a full 80 along the south boundary of section 34.

When the

south quarter corner marker was established at point 8 in 1982,
the dispute flared and this litigation ensued, (Exhibit 7) .
10.

The issue of access by the Plaintiffs is disputed

and clearly at issue.

The Plaintiffs maintain that they have

always obtained access to U-125 by coming out of gate 11,
traveling south next to fence, 2-5-6, and exiting through gate
12.

The Defendants claim that gate 12 was not built until the

late 70's when a new fence was built, 1-2-3, in the old
alignment, (T 183,203-204).

The Defendants also testified of

gates 13 and 14 farther to the west that were used by the
Plaintiffs for access to T-3.

Upon cross examination, the

Plaintiffs admitted that the public had not had access to T-3
since fence 1-2-3-4 was built along the north edge of U-125 (T
25, 224). They also admitted that their access was only to
remove crops when they were grown on T-3.

They further

admitted that when using such access that they only used up to
the first 20' of the disputed strip 5-6-7-8 for such limited
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access, (T 222-223)-

The only use of the Plaintiffs to the

disputed strip is this very limited crop removal access.

The

Plaintiffs further testified that they had never grazed their
cattle east of fence 2-5-6, or that they had ever plowed,
planted or harvested any crops east of fence 2-5-6.
11.

The title to the SW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of section

34 has been transferred by deed to Jos.. T.

Finlinson, Inc.,

see testimony of Fred L. Finlinson, (T 133).
12.

The Defendant, Jos.. T. Finlinson, Inc., has a

crop sharing arrangement with Spencer Butler for the operation
of T-2, but the agreement does not provide for the transfer of
or effect legal title to T-2 in any way, (T 209).
13.

The Defendant, Rich L. Finlinson, is an officer

of the corporation, Jos.. T. Finlinson, Inc., but has not
entered into any contracts effecting the title to the disputed
strip in any individual capacity, (T 209).
14.

The Plaintiffs started to build fence 7-8 after

the placement of the marker of the South quarter corner of
section 34 by the BLM without notice to the Defendants.

The

Defendants gave notice to the Plaintiffs that such action was
considered a trespass and requested the Plaintiffs to remove
the posts or the posts would be removed and placed on T-3,
(Exhibit 15). The Plaintiffs did not remove the posts, as
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requested, so Defendants did remove the posts and placed the
posts back on T-3 for the Plaintiffs use.

The Plaintiffs had

knowledge of the removal and the fact that the posts were on
their property and took no further action to secure such posts,
(T 182a).

Defendants exhibit 15 is a copy of the letter giving

notice to the Plaintiffs requesting the removal of the posts.
15.

The parties and their predecessors since the

erection of fence 5-6 have jointly maintained this fence, (T
185-188).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The evidence presented at the trial court indicated
that the Defendants had possession of the disputed strip since
the predecessors of the parties established the fence between
the two separate parcels of property.

The date of the

establishment of this fence was not known by any of the parties
or witnesses.

It was before patents were issued, and one of

the witnesses who was 78 at the time of trial, could never
remember when the fence was not in its present location.

From

the dates when patents were issued, the existing fence line has
separated the ownership of the respective parties.
The Defendants were found by the Court in its Decision
to have been in possession based on evidence which indicated
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that it had been fenced and was a part of either the
Defendants' or their predecessor's agriculture operations since
settlement of the area.

The property in dispute was enclosed

by a substantial barrier, a three strand barb wire fence, was
grazed, farmed, (dry land wheat initially and later barley and
other types of grain)) and most recently, irrigated by
sprinkling system to support the growth of barley and other
grains. The only use of this disputed strip by the Plaintiffs,
since the abandonment of the old dirt road, which occurred
prior to the memory of any of the parties or witnesses, was an
occasional use of the land immediately east of the existing
fence for the removal of harvested crops which may not have
occurred in some years.

Occasional it was also used for access

for maintenance of the existing fence.

This use as road way,

was limited to a portion of the disputed strip immediately east
of the fence.
The actual possession of the Defendants' rebuts the
presumption of possession accorded the Plaintiffs by UCA
78-12-7, (presumption of possession to the record title holder
unless rebutted by evidence of possession which is adverse to
the record title holder).

Note:

Appendix 1 which is attached

contains the full text of all statutes cited herein.

The type

of possession which must be found to be adverse, is set forth
in UCA 78-12-9 for those claiming under written instrument and
under UCA 78-12-11 for those claiming without written
- 11 -

instrument.

The Defendants have a claim under both a written

instrument, i.e. recorded conveyances from patent, and
unwritten, by acquiescence.

The Defendants' possession

qualifies under either section.

The Plaintiffs' presumption of

possession does not overcome the facts of the Defendants1
actual possession.
The issue of the payment of taxes has not be properly
analyzed because each party has paid the taxes for a full 80 on
each side of the disputed fence.

In the 1982 BLM survey, an

extra 99.91' were found to exist and the BLM established the
South quarter corner in the middle of this extra acreage.

Thus

the east 79* of the disputed strip has not be taxed by Millard
County.

Neither of the parties have been taxed or have paid

for this extra acreage.

The Plaintiffs have not paid taxes on

the East 79' of the disputed strip, they have not had adverse
possession because of the Defendant's actual possession,
therefor they have not fully qualified for quiet title by
adverse possession.
The Plaintiffs are barred by the Statue of
Limitations, both UCA 78-12-5 & 6 on their claim for quiet
title based on their record of title because they have not had
possession of the disputed parcel.

To avoid the bar, they must

prove their possession, not simply benefit from a rebutted
presumption of possession.
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The Defendants, who have had adverse possession, have
also not paid taxes on the extra acreage and they are not
entitle to quiet title based on adverse possession.

In this

absence of a statutory remedy, the common law doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence, provides the only remedy that
resolves this dispute.

The boundary was established by the

predecessor's of the parties.

It has been honored until 1982

when the extra acreage was first discovered.

The Defendants

should be awarded quiet title based on the established fence
line*

ARGUMENT

I. DEFENDANTS HAD POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED STRIP SINCE
PREDECESSORS OF PARTIES ESTABLISHED THE EXISTING BOUNDARY FENCE
A.

Defendants' possession was acknowledged by the

District Court.
In its written Decision, dated September 13, 1985,
pages 179 to 182 of the District Court record, the Court found
that for over 50 years that the Defendants and their
predecessors had occupied the disputed strip for their farming
operations as a part of a larger parcel of property, "T-2,"
that the Defendants' possession required court eviction to
allow the Plaintiffs to possess the disputed strip and that the

- 13 -

fence which separated the parties property had been in
existence for over 50 years.
B.

Defendants' asserted claims under a written

instruments and by asserting boundary by acquiescence, which is
an unwritten claim.
The Defendants purchased a large Tract from the
Nielsons, (T 134), who had a chain of title back to the
issuance of the original patent.

The seller, Gordon Nielson,

represented and the purchaser, Jos. T. Finlinson, Inc,
understood that the property being sold which included the
SWl/4 of the SEl/4, covered all the property within the Nielson
fence lines, from fence to fence, (T 160). Seller has now
conveyed such property by deed to the Defendants, (T 133).
C.

Since before Patent, the Defendants' predecessors

in title, the Nielson's have fenced, farmed and grazed the
disputed strip in the operation of their agricultural
operation.

Refer to the testimony of Gordon Nielson, (T

160-178) .
D.

Since the purchase from the Nielson's, the

Defendants have maintained the existing boundary fence, have
farmed raising grain crops, recently irrigated with the use of
a sprinkling system to enhance the growth of the grain crops,
grazed for forage for its commercial beef herd during the late

- 14 -

fall, winter, and early spring of each year since purchase.
Refer to the testimony of Rich L. Finlinson, (T 179-200),
Spence Butler, (T 201-214), and Fred L.

Finlinson, (T 129-159)

and Exhibits 3, 4, and 7.
E.

The Plaintiffs have not farmed or grazed their

cattle on the disputed strip.

See the testimony of Grayson

Roper, (T 48), and Bruce Roper, (T 109). The maximum use by
the Plaintiffs since the closure of the old mail road, which
occurred prior to the memory of any of the parties or witness,
has been as a right of way to remove crops in some years or to
maintain the existing fence, Testimony of Grayson Roper, (T 48)
and Bruce Roper, (T 106-109).

At best, the trial record

supports a possible easement by prescriptive right for the
removal of an occasional crop.

II. REBUTTAL OF THE PRESUMPTION OF POSSESSION OF THE RECORD
TITLE HOLDER DOES NOT REQUIRE THE PAYMENT OF TAXES PLUS A
SHOWING OF ADVERSE POSSESSION.
The District Court erred when it required the
Defendants in this case to prove adverse possession and the
payment of taxes in order to rebut the presumption of
possession provided by UCA 78-12-7.
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In order to find that the Defendants occupied the
disputed strip, that the Defendants had to be evicted for the
Plaintiffs to possess the disputed strip, the court actuallyfound that the Defendants had possession of the disputed
strip.

See written Decision, (T 179-182) of the District Court

Record.

Such a finding rebuts by definition, any finding that

the Plaintiffs had possession.

UCA 78-12-5 requires the

Plaintiffs to "be seized or possessed of the property...within
seven years before the commencement of the action." UCA 78-12-6
requires a similar possession for either a Plaintiff or a
defendant to be "seized or possessed" for seven years.

When

the court finds that the Defendants occupied the disputed
property, it has rebutted the presumption of UCA 78-12-7.
property can not be occupied by both parties.

The

This position

was fully argued in the Defendants* Memorandum In Support of
Defendants1 Motion for a New Trail, Pages 199 to 213 of the
District Court record.

III. THE DEFENDANTS1 POSSESSION WAS ADVERSE TO THE PLAINTIFFS'
AND REBUTS ANY PRESUMPTION OF POSSESSION TO THE RECORD TITLE
OWNER. STANDARDS FOR JUDGING ADVERSITY OF POSSESSION HAVE BEEN
SET FORTH IN BOTH STATUTE AND THE CASE LAW AND THE DEFENDANTS'
POSSESSION MEETS BOTH STANDARDS FOR ADVERSITY.
A.

Statutory definitions for adverse possession have

been defined in UCA 78-12-9 for possession under a claim based
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on a written instrument.

This possession is deemed adverse if

such occupancy was either 1) usually cultivated or improved, 2)
protected by a substantial enclosure, 3) used for purpose of
husbandry or for pasturage or the ordinary farming use of the
occupant, or 4) when the parcel was a part of a larger parcel
or farm that was used or farmed, the use of the unused part is
deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the
improved part of the farm.
The Statutory definitions of adversary possession for
an unwritten claim, UCA 78-12-11 include possession which is
deemed adverse when it 1) has been protected by a substantial
enclosure, 2) where it has been usually cultivated or improved
or 3) where labor or money has been expended for the purpose of
irrigating such lands in excess of $5 per acre.
The facts presented to the District Court as
summarized in the Statement of Facts, and as found by the
District Court in its Written Decision, clearly set forth
possession deemed to be have been adversely held, UCA 78-12-8 &
10, therefore any such findings of possession rebut a
presumption of possession, provided in UCA 78-12-7.
B.

The Utah Case law in a line of cases supports the

use of land as pasturage as adverse possession, Adams v.
Lamico, 118 U. 209, 221 P2d 1037, even a three week use for
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sheep grazing is adverse, Copper v. Carter Oil Co., 7 U(2d) 9,
316 P2d 320.

IV. NEITHER PARTY PAID TAXES FOR PORTIONS OF THE DISPUTED
WHERE THE EXISTING FENCE LINE IS LOCATED, THEREFORE NEITHER
PARTY CAN ADVERSE POSSESS THE OTHER PARTY HAS REQUIRED BY UCA
78-12-12.
The testimony of James A. Cox, the Millard County
Surveyor, in his deposition which was admitted by the District
Court as evidence, states that the distance of the south line
of Section 34, was in excess of one mile, the Roper half was
2689.98 and the Finlinson half was 2689.93' for a total of
5379.91', see pages 12-13 of the Cox deposition.
amounted to 99.91'.

The excess

Since patent, the competing parties

property has been described legally on the records of Millard
County as exactly 80 acre tracts of land.

See Cox deposition,

Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5.
When the BLM Surveyor in 1982 found the extra acreage
mentioned above, he followed BLM policy and established the
Southwest Corner at the site of the 1915 Brass Cap, "10", then
measured approximately one mile north, "10-9" and found the
site where four existing fence lines established the Southeast
Corner "9" and placed a Brass Cap at this point.

He then used

the single proportionate method of re-establishment, which
means that the distance, including the extra footage was
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divided equally, with the new South Quarter Corner, "8", being
the mid point between the Southwest and the Southeast corners.
See Zaninovich's testimony, (T 64-65).
This single porportionate method of reestablishment is
a well established practice, See Cox deposition, (T 19-20);
however, it means that neither party was ever taxed by Millard
County for the extra 99.91' which was not found until 1982 by
the BLM.

Each Party and their predecessor's were only assessed

and paid on an exact 80 acre tract which left a strip of
property almost a 100' wide that has never been either assessed
and therefore never paid by either party.

When the Plaintiffs

are given credit for paying the taxes on the S 1/2 of the SWl/4
of Section 34, T15S, R 4W, it leaves the east 79.42' of the
disputed 129.4 strip beyond the description on which the
Plaintiffs were assessed or paid taxes on.

(Roper's half

2689.94 "10-8", - a regular 80, 2640.0 = 49.98'.

The disputed

Strip, 129.4', - the Roper's share of the extra footage, 49.98'
= the amount of the disputed not taxed to or paid by the
Roper's, 79.42'.

Thus the south quarter corner, "8", was

approximately 50' beyond the acreage actually taxed by Millard
County to either Party; therefore neither party can quiet title
under the provisions of UCA 78-12-12.
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V. THE ONLY REMEDY AVAILABLE TO RESOLVE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
DISPUTED STRIP IS THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF ACQUIESCENCE.
The Plaintiffs had basically two claims for ownership
of the disputed tract, either adverse possession or record
title.

To successfully assert record ownership based on the

1982 BLM survey, the Plaintiffs must get pass the bar contained
in both UCA 78-12-5 & 6 which requires seven years of
possession.

A finding of actual possession in the Defendants

as the court found in its Written Decision and as facts compel,
raises the bar of the Statute of Limitations and the
Plaintiffs' claim based on record title fails.

In order for

the Plaintiffs to prevail on an adverse possession claim, under
UCA 78-12-12, the Plaintiffs must show adverse possession plus
payment of taxes.

This claim must fail because the Plaintiffs

never claimed adverse possession.

The court created only a

presumption of possession, which its own findings rebutted, and
coupled with the fact that neither party paid taxes on the
99.91' of extra acreage found to exist in 1982, the Plaintiffs
have not qualified for quiet title under UCA 78-12-12.
The Defendants can not claim, nor did the Defendants
ever claim, that it had a claim under UCA 78-12-12 for the
disputed strip, because it was clear that the Defendants had
only paid the taxes on its 2640' even though it had clearly
occupied the disputed strip to the exclusion of the Plaintiff.
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It is clear however, that the Defendants did have possession of
the entire disputed strip to the exclusion of the Plaintiffs so
that the Defendants can raise the affirmative defense of UCA
78-12-5 & 6 to the Plaintiffs' claims.

The Defendant's

possession also allows its unwritten claim of acquiescence to
the disputed Strip of property to be considered.
The remaining remedy is the common law of acquiescence
as found in a line of Utah cases under the often cited and
familiar ruling in the case of Fuoco v. Williams, 18 U2d 282,
421 P2d 944.

The sanctity and integrity of such a title were

approved also in Farrer v. Johnson, 2 U2d 189, 271 P2d 462
(1954), where, in addressing UCA 78-12-12, the Utah Court said:
"Plaintiffs' record titles in the two cases are barred by the
Statute of Limitations, UCA 78-12-5 and 6," and that:

"The presumption of possession statute . . .
requires a person to establish a legal title
before the occupation of the property by
another is deemed to have been in
subordination to the legal title. Here,
Plaintiffs' prima facie case of legal title
established by introducing in evidence the
deeds in question was overcome by
Defendants' proof of title by adverse
possession, so plaintiff failed to establish
legal title."
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Substitute "title by acquiescence" for "adverse
possession" in the above quote, and we have the instant case.
The "possession" presumed to have been in the
plaintiff, flies in the teeth of that part of the decision that
"the tract has been occupied by the defendant, its predecessors
and others for over 50 years for both farming, and to gain
access to other areas of their property."
An examination of the pleadings, shows that the
Plaintiffs' cause of action is based on "government markers"
and that defendant failed to prove it was an adverse possessor
under the statutes.

Neither side took such a position in their

pleadings or proof,,

The plaintiff has invented the idea that

defendant claimed, under the adverse possession statutes, which
is fallacious.

Defendants' claim is non-statutory and one

based upon physical facts to demonstrate title by acquiescence.
On the other hand, the District Court has espoused the
idea that defendants claimed under the statute, but failed for
non-payment of taxes.

This was a gratuity the defendant never

embraced and one completely antithetical to its theory of title
by acquiescence, which, it is urged, was proved by a great
preponderance of the evidence.
By deciding in Plaintiffs' favor on the assumption
that they were "presumed" to have possession of the property
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for seven

years before filing their action, it follows that the

defendant could

not have had possession during such period.

The facts belie such a conclusion, and besides, the Court found
and decided that defendants did have such possession which was
included in a continuous period of over 50 years.

There is no

question raised as to the other 3 requirements to establish
title by acquiescence, announced in the Fuoco case, i.e., (2)
"occupation up to a visible line marked by . . . fences, (3)
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary (there being no
evidence otherwise), by (4) adjoining landowners.
The facts supporting defendants" claim of title by
acquiescence, briefly may be condensed as follows:
Both parties claim their adjoining tracts by mesne
conveyances stemming from federal patents, to predecessors in
title then in possession.

The tracts were in a rugged,

sparsely settled area where people traveled by horse and wagon
and where land was cheap, and title records difficult to come
by in most cases, quite unlike the urban scenario existing at
the time of Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P2d 500 (1984), a case to
which plaintiff quickly turned after this suit was filed, not
to support a basic claim of title by written instrument, but to
shift to a strange, new and novel theory of "title by
government marker".

(Note:

The Halladay case did not so
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decide, but may have invited such doctrine, by suggestion, the
case having been decided on a tort theory of negligence,
denying one title if he fails to go to the County Recorder or
federal land records depository, or surveys, to check the
accuracy of his claimed title).
In the instant case, predecessors of the parties built
the fence which existed beyond the time of living octogenarian
witnesses, and it persists intact to date.

Both parties and

their forebear raised crops and livestock on their sides of the
fence and the land has been cultivated so as to render
sprinkling a realistic and practical means of irrigation.
Aerial photos reflect such continued use, without any apparent
interruption.

There was no evidence of any other reason for

the fence other than a boundary until the present litigation,
after a road, commonly used by occupiers of the adjoining
tracts and others by permission, used as dirt road to go to and
from Leamington, Utah, which road was closed about the turn of
the century with the advent of a County road serving the same
purpose.
The facts of this case, in most part undisputed,
clearly call for title by acquiescence in defendant under the
Utah cases decided up to the time of the Halladay case in 1984,
which case the plaintiff loudly acclaimed and cited in the
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instant case in its latest pleadings.

Plaintiff attempts to

distract from the real issue here, by now claiming that
defendant has not shown diligence in going to the archives for
proof of title and by ignoring government markers which
denegrates the principle of title by acquiescence.
attack on Defendants' title.

This is an

It is axiomatic that one must

rely on the strength of his own title and not the weakness of
his opponent's.
The Utah cases reflect the wisdom and practicability
of quieting title by acquiescence in cases like the one we have
here.
The theory of the Halladay case simply being that
before one can assert title by acquiescence, he must first
examine, as an abstracter would, the official records, failing
which, such record prevails over an already valid claim of
title born of possession and use within ancient markers or
fences without objection by neighbors or by consent, express or
implied.

Merely as reminders, the following may be presented:
In Provonsha v. Pitman, 305 P2 486 (1957), the Utah

Supreme Court unanimously announced that: "The sole problem is
whether the facts reasonably support the conclusion that a
boundary by acquiescence was established over the years," and
that:
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"the disputed area represents about 5% of
the land plaintiffs claim. We note this
fact not only to show the almost
infinitesimal value of the land at that
time, but to suggest the likelihood that, in
those early days when land was literally
dirt cheap in the area, persons reasonably
may have preferred to establish what might
have been a not too accurate boundary and to
have been content that it should be the
dividing line, rather than to expend a sum
that, undoubtedly would have exceeded the
value of the land involved."

And in King v. Fronk, 378 P2 893 (1963) it was said that:

"It is significant in most cases, a
physical, visible means of marking the
boundary was effected at a time when it was
cheaper to risk the mistake of a few feet
rather than to argue about it, go to Court,
or indulge the luxury of a survey, pursuance
of any of which motives may have proved more
costly than the possible but most expedient
sacrifice of a small land area. The rub
comes when, after many years, land value
appreciation tempts a test of the
vulnerability of a claimed ancient
boundary. The struggle usually involves
economics. Nothing is wrong in the urge to
acquire or retain. But neither is there
anything wrong in the law's espousal of a
doctrine that says that with the passage of
a long time, accompanied by an ancient
visible line, marked by monuments with other
pertinent and particular facts, and with a
do-nothing history on the part of the
parties concerned, can result in putting to
rest titles to property and prevent
protracted and often belligerent litigation
usually attended by dusty memory, departure
of witnesses, unavailability of trustworthy
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testimony, irritation with neighbors and the
like. This idea is based on the concept
that we must live together in a spirit
justifying repose or fixation of title where
there has been a disposition on the part of
neighbors to leave an ancient boundary as is
without taking some affirmative action to
assert rights inconsistent with evidence of
a visible, long-standing boundary."

One of the reasons that reflects Halladay's
inapplicability here was voiced in Eckberg v. Bates, 239 P2 205
(1951) where it was said that:

"Appellants contend that the evidence
adduced herein is insufficient to sustain
this finding because at the time this
fence was built, a survey could have
determined the true boundary line and
therefore the element of uncertainty
necessary in establishing a boundary line
by acquiescence was lacking. It is true
that the line called for by the deeds
could have easily been ascertained by a
survey. However, a boundary line may be
"uncertain" or "in dispute" even though
it is capable of being readily
ascertained. The vital question is
whether the adjacent owners when they
fixed the line or acquiesced in its being
fixed were uncertain or in dispute about
the location of the actual line."

See also, Willie v. Local Realty, 175 P2 718 (1946)
Again, in Baum v. Defa, 525 P2 725 (1971), Mr. Justice
Crockett, speaking for a unanimous Court said:
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"The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
derives from realization, ancient in our
law, that the peace and good order of
society is best served by leaving at rest
possible disputes over long established
boundaries. Its essence is that where there
has been any type of a recognizable physical
boundary, which has been accepted as such
for a long period of time, it should be
presumed that any dispute or disagreement
over the boundary has been reconciled in
some manner."

And again the Court said in Harding v. Allen, 353 P2 911:

"The existence of a fence that in 1937 was
so aged as to be rotting away certainly
justified the conclusion that it had been
there for a long time, and this fact, absent
any affirmative action by anyone insisting
on its removal from 1937 and 1954, bears but
the correctness of the trial court's finding
that a boundary by acquiescence equitably
had been established, under principles
enunciated and reaffirmed by this court and
summarized by Mr. Chief Justice McDonough in
Ringwood v. Bradford, particularly that part
quoted from Brown v. Milliner."

It would appear to be unthinkable that the heirs of
pioneers in 1882 and their descendants of 1915, when records
were made in government depositaries, who relied on natural and
other monuments, and their neighbors1 integrity, would lose
their inherited land because of a 1984 developer claimed such
heirs had not ridden horseback and later in T. Model Fords,
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over miles of dusty wilderness roads to read a puzzling metes
and bounds description on a deed to assure them peaceful
possession and title to land occupied by them and their
forebears for over half a century.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the trial court by finding that
the Defendants possessed the disputed strip.

That such

possession rebutted the presumption of possession created by
the court from UCA 78-12-7 and that such possession by the
Defendants is a bar to the Plaintiffs1 claim under title of
recorder owner and to its claim under adverse possession.

This

court should quiet title to the disputed strip in the
Defendants based upon the doctrine of acquiescence and the
Defendants/Appellants should be awarded its costs incurred in
connection with this appeal.
DATED this /y^day of October, 1986.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Fr^d W. Finlanson
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
CDN0833F
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EXHIBIT 1
TEXT OP UTAH STATUTES CITED
S. Seizure or possession within seven years
ssary.
action for the recovery of real propeny or for
ssession thereof shall be maintained, unless it
s that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or
essor was seized or possessed of the propeny
stion within seven years before the comment of the action.
1953

75-12-6. Actions or defenses founded upon title
to real estate.
No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to
an action, founded upon the title to real propeny or
to rents or profits out of the same, shall be effectual, unless it appears that the person prosecuting

the action7"or interposing the" defense or counterclaim, or under whose title the action is prosecuted
5.1. Seizure or possession within seven
or defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor,
n - Proviso - Tax tide.
predecessor or grantor of such person was seized or
action for the recovery of real property or for
possessed of the property in question within seven
ossession thereof shall be maintained, unless
years before the committing of the act in respect to
aintiff or his predecessor was seized or possewhich such action is prosecuted or defense or couaf such propeny within seven years from the
nterclaim made.
i933
lencement of such action; provided, however,
78-12-7. Adverse possession - Possession
vith respect to actions or defenses brought or
presumed in owner.
losed for the recovery or possession of or to
In every action for the recovery of real propeny,
title or determine the ownership of real propor the possession thereof, the person establishing a
igamst the holder of a tax title to such proplegal title to the property shall be presumed to have
no such action or defense shall be commenced
been possessed thereof within the time required by
erposed more than four years after the date of
law; and the occupation of the propeny by any
ix deed, conveyance, or transfer creating such
other person shall be deemed to have been under
itle unless the person commencing or lnterposuch action or defense or his predecessor has and in subordination to the legal title, unless it
ily occupied or been in possession of such appears that the propeny has been held and possem y wuhin four years prior to the commence- ssed adversely to such legal title for seven years
i*S3
or interposition of such action or defense or before the commencement o f the action.
n one year from the effective date of this 78-12-7.1. Adverse possession - Presumption Proviso - Tax title.
dment.
'
i*s3
In every action for the recovery or possession of
-5.2. Holder of tax title - Limitations of
real property or to quiet title to or determine the
ion or defense - Proviso.
owner thereof the person establishing a legal title to
i action or defense for the recovery or possessuch property shall be presumed to have been posof real propeny or to quiet title or determine
sessed thereof within the time required by law; and
iwnership thereof shall be commenced or intethe occupation of such property by any other person
nd against the holder of a tax title after the
shall be deemed to have been under and in subordation of four years from the date of the sale,
ination to the legal title, unless it appears that such
eyance or transfer of such tax title to any
propeny has been held and possessed adversely to
ty, or directly to any other purchase [purchaser]
such legal title for seven years before the commenof at any public or private tax sale and after
cement of such action. Provided, however, that if in
xpiration of one year from the date of this act
any action any party shall establish pnma facie
ided, however, that this section shall not bar
evidence that he is the owner of any real propeny
action or defense by the owner of the legal title
under a tax title held by him and his predecessors
ich propeny where he or his predecessor has
for four years prior to the commencement of such
illy occupied or been in actual possession of
action and one year after the effective date of this
propeny within four years from the commenamendment he shall be presumed to be the owner of
nt or interposition of such action or defense,
such property by adverse possession unless it
provided further, that this section shall not bar
appears that the owner of the legal title or his predefense by a city or town, to an action by the
decessor has actually occupied or been in possession
er of a tax title, to the effect that such city or
of such propeny under such title or that such tax
i holds a hen against such propeny which is
title owner and his predecessors have failed to pay
1 or superior to the claim of the holder of such
all the taxes levied or assessed upon such propeny
Itle
1953 within such four-year period
1953
2-5.3. Definition of "tax title" [and "action"
78-12-8. Lnder written instrument or judgment.
separability].
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those
le term "tax title" as used in section 78-12- under whom he claims, entered into possession of
and section 59-10-65, and the related the property under claim of title, exclusive of other
nded sections 78-12-5 1, 78-12-7, and 78- right, founding such claim upon a written instru2, means any title to real propeny, whether ment as being a conveyance of the property in queI or not, which has been derived through or is stion, or upon the decree or judgment of a compendent upon any sale, conveyance or transfer of tent court, and that there has been a continued
propeny in the course of a statutory procee- occupation and possession of the propeny included
for the liquidation of any tax levied against in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some
property whereby the propeny is relieved from part of the property under such claim, for seven
{lien
vcars, the property so included is deemed to have
nition of "Action "
been held adversely, except that when the property
The word "action" as used in these sections so included consists of a tract divided into lots, the
ides counterclaims and cross-complaints and possession of one lot is not deemed a possession of
ivil actions wherein affirmative relief is sought
any other lot of the same tract.
1953
Llidity in P a n .
If any section or pan of section of this act shall
leld invalid, it shall not invalidate the remaining
ions of this act.
1953

-
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78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession
under wntten instrument.
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claiming a title founded upon
a wntten instrument or a judgment or decree, land
is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in
the following cases:
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or
improved
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial
mclosure.
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been
used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber,
for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or
for the ordinary use of the occupant.
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been
partly improved, the portion of such farm or lot
that may have been left not^cleared or not inclosed
according to the usual course and custom of the
adjoining county is deemed to have been occupied
for the same length of time as the part improved
and cultivated.
1953
78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written
instrument or judgment.
Where it appears that there has been an actual
continued occupation of land under claim of title,
exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a
wntten instrument, judgment or decree, the land so
actually occupied, and no other, is deemed to have
been held adversely.
1953
78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession not
under wntten instrument.
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming title, not founded upon
a written instrument, judgment or decree land is
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the
following cases o n l y
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial
mclosure
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or
improved
(3) Where labor or money has been expended
upon dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or
otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such 'ands
amounting to the sum of 55 per acre
1953
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and
taxes paid.
In no case shall adverse possession be considerea
established under the provisions of any section or
this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has
been occupied and claimed for the period of seven
years continuously, and that the party, his predece
ssors and grantors have paid all taxes which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according
to law
1953
78-12-12.1. Possession and payment of taxes Proviso - Tax title.
In no case shall adverse possession be established
under the provisions of this code, unless it shall be
shown that the land has been occupied and claimed
for the period of seven years continuously, and that
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid
all the taxes which have been levied and assessed
upon such land according to law Provided,
however, that payment bv the holder of a tax title to
real property or his predecessors, of all the taxes
levied and assessed upon such real propeny after the
delinquent tax sale or transfer under which he
claims for a period of not less than four years and
for not less than one year after the effective date of
this amendment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of this section in regard to the
payment of taxes necessary to establish adverse
possession.
1953

